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Lazer: Land Use Cases

THE SUPREME COURT'S LAND USE DECISIONS
Hon. Leon D. Lazer*:
INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon. Last year's Term of the Supreme Court
continued a trend, let us say a movement, in the direction of greater
protection of property rights which commenced in 1987.1 In Dolan
v. City of Tigard,2 an Oregon case, the United States Supreme
Court rendered a decision which has caused great alarm among
3
municipal officials and students of municipal police power.

* Judge Lazer received his L.L.B. from New York University Law
School. He served as an Associate Justice on the Appellate Division, Second
Department from 1979-1986 and as a New York State Supreme Court Justice
from 1973-1979. In addition he is the chairman of the Pattern Jury Instruction
Committee of the New York State Association of Supreme Court Justices.
1. The United States Supreme Court resumed its interest in land use cases
in 1987 with the landmark cases of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987), First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987), and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The Court continued this trend last year
with cases such as Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) and Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
2. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
3. See Bradley Inman, Court Decision Could Muddle Housing Policies,
THE S.F. EXAMiNER, July 10, 1994, at E-5 (stating that "the balance of power
has shifted and the ability of the developer to threaten a lawsuit is greater" due
to the Dolan decision); Alex Philipidis, Supreme Court's Land-Use Decision
Draws Local Praise,WESTCHESTER COUNTY BUS. J., July 25, 1994, at 6 (stating
"that [the Dolan] decision is going to inhibit the freedom of municipal planning
boards to demand improvements as liberally as they have done previously");
Frank Shafroth, Cities Lose Takings Clause Case in Dolan v. City of Tigard,
NATION'S CrrEs WKLY., July 4, 1994, at I (finding that the decision could lead
to a significant increase in the federal court intrusion into municipal land use
planning and development).
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However, it is really inappropriate to discuss Dolan without first
considering its forebear, Nollan.4 Those two cases go together.
I. THE COURT'S EARLY INTEREST IN LAND USE
REGULATION
The Supreme Court's renewed interest in land use cases is quite
recent. 5 In 1926, the Court decided Euclid v. Ambler Co.,6 and
approved the use of the police power for land use regulation. What
we now call Euclidian zoning is the land use regulation system that
this country has adopted as a result of that case. 7 Euclidian zoning
involves districts that specify the permitted uses and area
dimensions in various locations as they appear on a zoning map.
In 1928, the United States Supreme Court decided Nectow v.
City of Cambridge.8 The case is interesting now, even as ancient as
it is, because in Nectow the Supreme Court found unconstitutional
the Cambridge zoning law as it affected the western portion of a
much larger piece of individually owned property. 9 Today, we
would call this kind of zoning decision, segmentation. Whether
segmentation applies to today's zoning concepts is highly
questionable. Whether the courts can simply strike down a zoning
ordinance if it affects only a small portion of a larger piece of

4. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
5. See supra note 1 (discussing the recent trend of the United States

Supreme Court in deciding land use issues).
6. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
7. The Euclidian zoning policy was basically that "zones of the same use
must be treated the same. For example, the owner of property in a light
industrial zone must have the same development rights as all other owners of
property in such a zone." Valley Briefing: The Zoning Game; Playing With a
City's Building Blocks, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1994, at B14.
8. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
9. Id at 185-88. The ordinance in this case placed a small portion of the
plaintiff's land in a residential zone while the remaining portion of the land
remained in a commercial zone. The residential restriction caused a purchaser of
the plaintiff's land to terminate a previously entered into sales contract. The
Court overruled the ordinance as the restriction did not bear a substantial
relation to the public health. Id
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property is in substantial doubt. Nevertheless, between 1928 and
1974, not a single zoning case was decided by the Supreme Court.
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court decided Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas,10 which dealt with the definition of
"family" for zoning purposes. 1 It was not until 1987, however,
that the Court embarked on a regular course of deciding land use
cases. 12 Was there some lack of interest or was there some lack of
land use litigation in those years that would explain the paucity of
cases in the Supreme Court? No. The Supreme Court bobbed and
weaved and, to be colloquial about it, simply ducked these kinds of
cases by speaking in terms of ripeness, of abstention, and of
exhaustion of state remedy. Between Euclid v. Ambler Co. 13 in
1926 and the 1987 renewed interest of the Supreme Court in
zoning and land use regulation,14 the state courts filled the gap. A

10. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
11. Id at 2. The Belle Terre ordinance that the Court upheld defined family
as:

[O]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household
servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) or no more than
two living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not
related by blood, adoption or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a
family.
Id

12. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
(holding that an uncompensated permanent public-access easement is violative
of the Takings Clause, however, if the government conditioned the appellant's
building permit on the granting of such an easement it would be a lawful landuse regulation if it furthered governmental purposes); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding
that pursuant to "the Just Compensation Clause where the government has taken
property by a land-use regulation, the land owner may recover damages for the
time before it is finally determined that the regulation constitutes a taking");
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)
(holding that the petitioners did not satisfy their burden of proving that § 4 and
§ 6 of the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation
Act constituted a taking without compensation in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
13. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
14. See supranotes 5-13.
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vast body of jurisprudence set forth for all of us the parameters for
the use of the police power to regulate the use of land.
II. NOLLAN V CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT'S 1987
DECISIONS
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided three cases
involving land use. 15 One of them was the very interesting First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale16 case, which
decided that a property owner could recover monetary damages for
the period that an unconstitutional ordinance or law restricted the
use of the property. 17 This decision was almost earth shattering for
the land use world.
In a second case decided that year, Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,18 the Supreme Court rendered a decision that
reverberates rather loudly in the Dolan case that we will discuss
this afternoon. 19 The California Coastal Commission is charged by
California law, with the underpinning of federal legislation, with
the protection of a great American resource, the California coast.
The Commission is also charged with the duty to protect both
20
physical and visual access to that coast.

15. See cases cited supra note 12.
16. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987).

17. Id. at 306-07 (holding the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments required
compensation for the period that an unconstitutional ordinance or law restricted
the use of the property).
18. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
19. See infra notes 7.1-111.
20. The Coastal Commission is given power by both the state and federal
governments. See 16 U.S.C. § § 1451-64 (1982). These sections provide in
pertinent part:

The key to more effective protection and use of the land and water
resources of the coastal zone is to encourage the states to exercise their
full authority over the lands and waters in the coastal zone by assisting
the states ... in developing land and water use programs for the coastal
zone including unified policies, criteria, standards, methods, and
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The California Coastal Commission grants development permits
in the areas along that coast within its jurisdiction. Between 1972
and 1985 the commission granted 42,000 such permits.2 1 Those of
you who have visited, are aware that development exists up and
down the California coastline. Such development clearly limits
access to the coast, both visually and physically.
The plaintiffs, in Nollan, leased a 504 square foot bungalow
along the beach of the Pacific Ocean.22 The provisions of the lease
mandated that a larger structure be built as a condition of the
option to buy the property. 2 3 The Nollans applied to the California
Coastal Commission as well as the local zoning authorities for
permission to construct a 2,500 square-foot two-story building to
replace the 504 square-foot bungalow. 24 The Coastal Commission
granted the permit on the condition that the Nollans provide an
25
easement across their portion of the beach.
Let me just illustrate for you what it actually looked like,
because what it looked like ultimately determined the Supreme
Court's opinion that there was no connection between what the
processes for dealing with land and water use decisions of more than
local significance.
Id; see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30001.5 (West 1995). Section 30001.5
states in pertinent part:
The Legislature further finds and declares that the basic goals of the state
for the coastal zone are to... [p]rotect, maintain, and, where feasible,
enhance and restore the overall quality of the coastal zone environment

and its natural and artificial resources... [and to m]aximize public
access to and along the coast and maximize public recreational
opportunities in the coastal zone.
Id
21. See Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 167
n.12, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578, 589 n.12 (1985); see also Paul Morrison, Note, Staring
Down the Barrel of Nollan: Can the Coastal Commission Dodge the Bullet?, 9
WHITTER L. REv. 579 (1987). "The Commission, in its first six years alone
granted permission for construction of nearly fifty thousand building units
within its land jurisdiction." Id. at 584.
22. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
23. Id at 828. "The Nollans' option to purchase was conditioned on their
promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it." Id.
24. Id at 826.
25. Id at 828.
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California Coastal Commission was demanding of the Nollans and
the obligation and jurisdiction of the Commission to protect visual
26
access to the ocean. The Nollans' lot fronts the Pacific Ocean.
There is a seawall which crosses their property which is about
eight feet high. Approximately ten feet exists between the seawall
and the mean high water mark. 27 The Coastal Commission wanted
the Nollans to dedicate an easement that would permit the public to
traverse the Nollans' beach front property and permit people to
pass from one to the other of two public beaches, located within a
quarter of a mile of the Nollans' property in either direction. 2 8 The
Nollans rejected the condition, brought suit alleging that the
condition amounted to a taking of property, 2 9 and then proceeded
30
to build without the permit.
The Commission, in fixing the condition, declared that the new
construction would burden the public's ability to traverse to and
along the waterfront. 3 1 Ultimately, that declaration of the Coastal
Commission was fatal to its position, because traversing the beach
front did not have any connection with visual access to the ocean.
The action was brought in the California courts by the Nollans.
They lost in the California Court of Appeals 32 and appealed
directly to the United States Supreme Court, 33 which took the case

26. Id.
27. Id. at 853 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

28. Id. at 826.
29. Id. at 829-30. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In a 1978 case, the
Supreme Court identified several factors to apply to determine whether there has
been a taking. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104
(1978). Some of the factors the Court looked at included the "economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant... [and] the character of the government
action. A 'taking' may readily be found when the interference with property can
be characterized as a physical invasion by government." Id at 124.
30. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829-30.
31. Id. at 829.
32. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223

Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986) (reversing the California Superior Court decision that was
in favor of the plaintiffs).
33. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
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after having rejected earlier cases involving attacks on land use
regulatory powers.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, made an interesting
analysis. If the Nollans had not sought a building permit and if the
California Coastal Commission had wanted an easement across the
property, it would have had to pay for it.3 4 Absent payment,
imposition of the easement would amount to a taking. 3 5 We
recognize, wrote Justice Scalia, that municipalities are beset with
problems, that they have the right for the benefit of the public and
of the constituents to impose conditions and restrictions. The Court
has no difficulty with that.36 However, there must be a connection
between the exaction or condition imposed and the jurisdiction of
the body that imposes it.37 The exaction must have a connection
with the need for the exaction. 38 There must be a nexus.
Justice Scalia repeated what you have read repeatedly, that a
regulation is not a taking if it substantially advances a legitimate
state interest and does not deny an owner economic viable use of
land. 39 Therefore, if the condition advanced a legitimate
governmental purpose and did not deprive the Nollans of viable
40
use of their land, it would be constitutional.

34. Id at 831.

35. Id at 831. Justice Scalia simply stated that "[h]ad California simply
required the Nollans to make an easement across their beach front available to
the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the
beach,... we have no doubt there would have been a taking." Id.
36. Id at 834 (recognizing that "land use regulation does not effect a taking
if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not '[d]eny an
owner economically viable use of his land"' (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980))).
37. Id at 838.

38. Justice Scalia held that this governmental action would fail even if the
Court applied a reasonable relation test. Id The Court found that it is "quite
impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the public
beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to
viewing the beach created by the new house." Id.
39. Id at 834 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980)).
40. Id at 835-36. The Court stated that "the Commission unquestionably
would be able to deny the Nollans their permit outright if their new
house... would substantially impede [legitimate governmental] purposes,
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There was no claim in Nollan that denial of the permit would
have deprived the Nollans of viable use of land. They still had a
piece of property that was valuable, building permit or not.
Justice Scalia further stated that the Court recognized
California's right to regulate and to protect visual access. 4 1 If the
California Coastal Commission had limited the height of the
building, which was increasing to two stories and would have some
effect on visual access to the ocean, or if it had imposed a
restriction on fencing that might restrict visual access, or even if it
had conditioned the permit on the Nollans providing a spot on their
property for people to view the ocean, that might be
constitutional. 42 But here, the condition imposed had nothing to do
with visual access. 43 What it had to do with was the desire of the
California Coastal Commission to provide a method for people to
walk up and down between two public beaches. 44 Indeed, the
California Coastal Commission had obtained easements from
almost all of the property owners up and down that beach and it
needed this easement as well. When Justice Scalia declared for the
'4 5
five person majority of the Court, was that there was no "nexus,"
which is the key word in Nollan, he meant that there was no nexus
between the requirement that the California Coastal Commission
imposed and visual access. 46 Justice Scalia gave an illustration of
what he meant. The importance of the illustration becomes more
visible in the Dolan case that I will discuss in a few moments. 47
unless the denial would interfere so drastically with the Nollans' use of their
property as to constitute a taking." Id.
41. Id. at 835. The Court agreed with the Commission's argument that
"among [the] permissible purposes are protecting the public's ability to see the
beach... and preventing congestion on the public beaches." Id.
42. Id. at 836.
43. Id. at 837. The Court stated that there was a "lack of nexus between the
condition and the original purpose of the building restriction." Id.
44. Id. at 828.
45. Nexus is defined as "a link... [or] a connected group or series."
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 797 (9th ed. 1989).
46. Id. at 837. "The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if
the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end
advanced as the justification for the prohibition." Id.
47. See infra notes 71-111.
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Justice Scalia's illustration envisions a government safety
regulation that prohibits the shouting of fire in a crowded theater,
but grants a dispensation to shout fire if the shouter pays $100 into
the state treasury. 4 8 Clearly, this is an illustration of non-nexus, but
the fact that Justice Scalia referred to a monetary sum reveals, in
the opinion of some, an intention by the Court to limit the ability
of municipalities to impose monetary exactions such as park fees
and things like that.
Ultimately, Justice Scalia declared that absent this nexus
between the need and the exaction, the condition imposed by the
California Coastal Commission "becomes an out-and-out scheme
of extortion." 4 9 If the California Coastal Commission wanted this
easement to fulfill what it deemed to be its obligation to make it
possible for people to walk between public beaches or for people to
have the right to walk across the Nollans' property, it had to pay
50
for it.
52
51
Four of the justices dissented. Justice Brennan's dissent
stated that the standard of review in cases such as this, has always
been reasonableness. 53 Was there some kind of a reasonable
connection between what the government was trying to do and
what it was exacting? Justice Brennan supported the reasoning of
the California Coastal Commission that the building of the Nollan

48. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
49. Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assoc. Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H.

1981)).
50. Id.at 841-42. "California is free to advance its 'comprehensive

program,' if it wishes, by using its power of eminent domain for this 'public
purpose' ... but if it wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it must
pay for it." Id
51. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissented. Justice
Marshall joined Justice Brennan's dissent. Id at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent. Id at 865 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
He also joined Justice Stevens' dissent. Id at 866 (Stevens, J.,
52. Id at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
by now commonplace that
53. Id at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "It is ...
this Court's review of the rationality of a State's exercise of its police power
demands only that the State 'could rationally have decided' that the measure
adopted might achieve the State's objective." Id.(Brennan, I., dissenting)
(quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)).
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house would create some kind of psychological barrier for those
who walked across the beach. If people could walk up and down
the beaches, that psychological barrier would be extinguished or
alleviated. 54 The Commission's approach to its problem was not
very useful to the defense of its position. Implicit in Justice
Brennan's dissent, is a criticism of the lawyering for the California
Coastal Commission.
Justice Brennan also noted that the California Constitution
provides that access to the ocean and to the tideland is
guaranteed. 55 Therefore, there is no reasonable expectation by an
owner adjacent to tideland or the sea that people will be excluded
from getting access to the water across the owner's property.
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia referred to a stick in the
bundle of rights that constitute the right of direct ownership of
property. 5 6 One of the most important sticks (referred to by Justice
Rehnquist in Dolan as a "strand" 57 ) is the right to exclude others
from the property. 58 Depriving the Nollans of the right to exclude
54. Id. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the Commission's "informed
judgment such a trade off would preserve the net amount of public access to the
coastline. The [majority's] insistence on a precise fit between the forms of
burden and condition on each individual parcel along the California Coast
would penalize the Commission for its public trust mandate." Id (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
55. Id at 855 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan quoted article X,
§ 4 of the California Constitution, which guarantees public access to the ocean.
This section of the constitution states that "the Legislature shall enact such laws
as will give the most liberal construction to this provision so that access to the
navigable waters of this State shall be always attainable for the people thereof."
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (emphasis added). Furthermore
California therefore has clearly established that the power of exclusion
for which [the Nollans'] seek compensation simply is not a strand in the
bundle of [their] property rights.., and [they] cannot claim that the deed
restriction has deprived them of a reasonable expectation to exclude from
their property persons desiring to gain access to the sea.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.

57. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2324 (1994).
58. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831. "We have repeatedly held that... 'the right to
exclude [others is] one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property."' Id. (quoting Loretto v.
TelePrompTer Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,433 (1982)).
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people from walking across their property, simply amounted to a
taking.59
Justice Brennan argued that the majority was subjecting the
police power exercise relative to property rights to heightened
scrutiny. Heightened scrutiny has not been the test in land use
regulation. 60 It has always been rational basis review. The majority
was quantifying something that had never quantified before and
subjecting the state to an intolerable supervision, hostile to the
basic principles of our government. 6 1 The standard always was a
reasonable relationship between the governmental purpose and the
regulation.
Those of us who have dealt in the field of land use on one side or
another have always been aware that when a planning board said
that it wanted the grant of some property because it had a plan to
widen a particular road in the future or when it exacted park land
as a condition of building a subdivision because children would be
coming into the development there was a reasonable connection
between the demand and the need. In other places, outside of New
York, for example, California, as well as some other states,
municipalities require developers to pay money into a fund to help
pay for the costs that the development might otherwise inflict on
the public. Thus, in San Francisco, if the developers are building
offices or factory buildings, the city assumes that people will be
moving into the city to work in those buildings, that the city cannot
afford to buy or build housing for them, and requires the
developers to build housing or pay into a fund money that will help
pay for housing. 62
59. Id "To say that the apportion of a public easement across a landowner's
premises does not constitute the taking of a property interest... is to use words

in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary meaning." Id
60. Id at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding that "[t]he Court imposes a
standard of precision for the exercise of a state's police power that has been
discredited for the better part of this century").
61. Id at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S.
374, 388 (1932)).
62. Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872

(9th Cir. 1991) (holding specifically that unlike the lack of nexus in Nollan, the
exacting here was directly aimed at a governmental interest in housing), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
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These relationships between the demands created by
development and the solutions are loose. No one who says to a
developer, "I want from you X feet along your entire frontage on
the street because we will widen the highway sometime in the
future," quantifies the additional burden that this new development
is going to place on highways. No one who pays, $250 an acre into
the park fund for each lot, quantifies how much park land the
children moving into the development will need in the future. It
has always been a reasonable relationship, and in Nollan, the
Supreme Court subjected the reasonableness to a heightened
scrutiny. 63
III. THE CONTINUING TREND OF LAND USE
DECISIONS: HOW THE COURTS DEALT WITH THE
NOLLAN DECISION
In the seven years between 1987 and 1994 other decisions were
rendered which dealt with the degree of scrutiny of police power
exercises relative to property. 64 But as might be expected, once the
shock of Nollan had diminished, the courts began to erode the case.
Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento65 dealt with a fund
that Sacramento required from people who were building industrial
plants. 66 The fund subsidized housing for the low-paid workers
who would eventually work in the plants. The Ninth Circuit found
that all Nollan really meant was that there had to be a reasonable
relationship between the purpose and the solution and there did not
63. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (stating there is not a taking when a land use
regulation "substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests"). But see
Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874 ("As a threshold matter, we are not
persuaded that Nollan materially changes the level of scrutiny we must apply.").
64. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (entitling
mobile home park owners to compensation under the Takings Clause of the
Constitution because a local Califomia rent control ordinance mounted to a
physical occupation of their property); PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928

F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a developer's denied permit did not
constitute a denial of substantive or procedural due process).
65. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
66. Id.
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seem to be a reasonable relationship in the facts of Nollan. There
was, however, a reasonable relationship betveen the housing needs
created by the building of an industrial plant and funding those
needs. 67
Other courts took a tighter view of Nollan. In the Seawall case,
involving a prohibition upon the destruction of single-room
occupancy buildings in New York City, unless the owners paid
money into a housing fund, the New York Court of Appeals found
that there had to be a closer connection between homelessness and
the destruction of single-room occupancy units. 68 The report the
City had relied upon in imposing these rather harsh restrictions was
insufficient to support a nexus. 69 In Seawall, the New York Court
of Appeals relied on Nollan in striking down the legislation. 70
IV. DOLAN V CITY OF TIGARD: THE RESTRICTIVE
TREND CONTINUES
Let us now discuss Dolan.7 1 In Dolan, the State of Oregon
enacted legislation requiring that each municipality enact a land
use plan.72 The City of Tigard, enacted a plan that provided in part
that in a central business district only eighty-five percent of each

67. Id at 875.
68. See Seawall Assocs. v. City of N.Y., 74 N.Y.2d 92, 542 N.E.2d 1059,
544 N.Y.S.2d 542, cert. denied,493 U.S. 976 (1989).
69. Id at 112, 542 N.E.2d at 1069, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 552.

70. The court followed Nollan's analysis by asking, "Is there a sufficiently
close nexus between these burdens and the 'end advanced as the justification for
[it]."' Id at 111, 542 N.E.2d at 1068, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (quoting Nollan, 483
U.S. at 841). The court found that in the absence of"an offsetting provision for
fair payment," the city's actions under the police power requiring single-resident
occupancy owners to dedicate their properties to a public purpose amounted to
an unconstitutional taking. Id at 115, 542 N.E.2d at 1070, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
71. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
72. Id at 2313. In addition to the zoning plan, the city enacted a Master
Drainage Plan due to the flooding along the Fanno Creek area, including the
area around the petitioner's land. Id To combat the risks of floods, the city
suggested a series of improvements to the creek's basin. These suggestions
included a "channel excavation in the area next to petitioner's property." Id.
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piece of property could be developed and fifteen percent had to be
73
free from all structures and pavement.
Dolan, the petitioner, owned a 1.67 acre parcel of land. 74 Fanno
Creek, prone to flooding coursed through the southwest portion of
the Dolan property. 75 The property contained a plumbing and
electric supply store of about 9,700 square feet7 6 and Dolan sought
a building permit to double the size of that store with the intention
to build some other stores in the future. 77 Dolan's plan also
provided for bicycle racks for people who transported themselves
78
both recreationally and for business purposes on bicycle.
As a result of the new improvements, Dolan intended to pave the
entire area and provide for thirty-nine parking places. Paving
meant the creation of impervious surfaces with consequences to
Fanno Creek and its flood plain. In other words, the storm water
that would flow from these impervious surfaces would travel into
the flood plain and increase the volume and speed with which the
water flowed down the channel at times when there was
flooding. 79
Dolan applied for a permit which was granted conditioned on a
dedication of land adjacent to the flood plain plus an additional
fifteen feet of land, which would be part of a greenway that was to
run throughout the City. 80 The greenway would run not only
through the flood plain, but through the additional fifteen feet of
land. The pedestrian/bike path would be located on the fifteen feet
of land and would be used for business and recreational
81
purposes.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.

76. Id. The store and a gravel parking lot were located on the eastern side of
the 1.67 acre plot of land. Id.
77. Id. at 2314. The proposed renovations were found to be "consistent with
the city's zoning scheme." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2313.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Dolan litigated the condition through two stages of appeal within
83
the City of Tigard 82 and ultimately through the Oregon courts
and into the United States Supreme Court. 84 The ultimate
consequence was the decision of the Supreme Court written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist.85 The Court held that not only must there
be a nexus between purpose and means, but there must also be
"rough proportionality" between the need and the exaction. 86 The
decision required that the governmental agency produce a real
quantification of the need that is to be balanced against the
exaction. 87
To summarize the facts, we have a variance application by
petitioner. The City requires her to dedicate ten percent of her
property in order for her to get the permit. The City explains that
Dolan must leave fifteen percent of her property undeveloped and
unbuilt pursuant to the local ordinance. The City was willing to
count the ten percent against the fifteen percent that was to remain
undeveloped. 88
Now, I am going to read to you some of the language used by the
City. It is important because these findings were deemed to be
insufficient by the Supreme Court on the issue of rough
proportionality. "[I]t is reasonable to assume that customers and
employees of the future uses of this site could utilize a
82. Id at 2315.

83. Id The petitioner appealed on the ground that the city's dedication
requirements "were not related to the proposed development and therefore those
requirements constituted an uncompensated taking of their property under the
Fifth Amendment." Id at 2314.
84. Id The Court granted certiorari in 1993 because of the conflict between
the Oregon Supreme Court's decision and the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Nollan.
85. Id. at 2312. The Chief Justice was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg joined. Id at 2322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter filed a separate dissent. Id at 2330 (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. Id at 2319. The Court held that "[n]o precise mathematical calculation
is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both in nature and to the extent to the
impact of the proposed development." Id.
at 2319-20.
87. Id at 2314.
88. Id
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pedestrian/bicycle pathway adjacent to this development for their
transportational and recreational needs." 89 It is reasonable to
expect that some of the people who will be using the bike racks
will be using the pathway. 90 Finally, the creation of a convenient,
safe pedestrian/bicycle system, "could," -- the Supreme Court does
not like the of use this word, -- "could offset some of the traffic
demand on [nearby] streets and lessen the increase in traffic
congestion." 9 1 On the basis of these findings, the City authorities
demanded a dedication of property as a condition of the issuance of
92
the building permit.
In affirming the City's position, 93 the Oregon Supreme Court
asserted that there is a Nollan nexus if the exaction serves the same
94
purposes that the denial of the permit would serve.
It is clear now that the Oregon Supreme Court's view of nexus
was overly simple. Not only must there be a nexus but it must be
"roughly proportional" to the need. The City's demand that Dolan
dedicate a portion of its property was disproportionate to the need,
which, in any event, had not been properly quantified. The United
States Supreme Court held that the dedication demand was
unconstitutional, a taking, and not proportional to the need. In so
holding, the Court was confronted with seventy years of
jurisprudence to the effect that those attacking constitutionality
have an extremely heavy burden in overcoming the strong
presumption of constitutionality. Indeed in New York, the burden
is to prove unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 5 In
other states, the proof must be clear and satisfactory. 96
89. Id. at 2314-15.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2315.
92. Id
93. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993).
94. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d
437, 443 (Or. 1993)).
95. See, e.g., G.V. Licari v. Scheyer, 193 A.D.2d 604, 606, 597 N.Y.S.2d
165, 167 (2d Dep't 1993) (stating that it is "axiomatic that one who claims a
land regulation has effected a taking of his property bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption of constitutionality which attaches[,]" indeed he
must prove that all but the bare residue of the value of the property has been
destroyed beyond a reasonable doubt); Sobel v. Higgins, 188 A.D.2d 286, 286,
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Justice Rehnquist's response was that those cases only apply
where the legislation at issue deals with large areas. 97 When the
issue involves the property of a single owner the process is
adjudicative and not subject to the presumptions of
constitutionality in favor of the constitutionality of legislation.
In concluding that the government cannot require a person to
give up a constitutional right in return for a discretionary benefit, 98

590 N.Y.S.2d 883, 884 (1st Dep't 1992) (holding that the regulation concerning
rental housing, including restrictions on rents and evictions, will be struck down
where the challenger has established that a statute is unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt); Schulz v. State, 156 Misc. 2d 169, 177, 601 N.Y.S.2d 239,
244 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1993) ("Legislative enactments are presumed to
be constitutional... while this presumption is rebuttable, unconstitutionality
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." (quoting Maresca v. Cuomo, 64
N.Y.2d 242,250,475 N.E.2d 95, 98, 485 N.Y.S.2d 724,727 (1984))).
96. See, e.g., Robinson v. Town of Riviera, 25 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1946)
("[T]he burden of proving an acceptance of a dedication of lands for the general
public rests on the party asserting it, and... must be clear, satisfactory and
unequivocal."); Waffle House v. DeKalb County, 406 S.E.2d 477, 479 (Ga.
1991) (stating that "the challenger to the validity of the ordinance, has the
burden to present clear and convincing evidence that he has suffered a
significant detriment which is unsubstantially related to the public health, safety,
morality and welfare"); LaSalle Nat'l Trust, N.A. v. Village of Westmont, 636
N.E.2d 1157, 1162 (I11. 1994) ("A zoning ordinance is presumed to be valid,
and the party challenging the presumption has the burden of establishing by
clear and convincing evidence that, as to the subjective property, the ordinance
is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and bears no substantial relationship
to public health, safety, or general welfare.").
97. Justice Rehnquist distinguished cases like Agins, Euclid, and Mahon by
stating that these cases "involved essentially legislative determinations
classifying entire areas of the city, whereas in [Dolan] the city made an
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit
on an individual parcel of land." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316. Therefore, the Court
found that there was no need to apply the above mentioned presumptions.
98. Id. at2317.
Under the well settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' the
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional
right... to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public
use - in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government
where the property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit.
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Justice Rehnquist cited some First Amendment cases. 99 Why is

that significant? It is significant because, as the Court stated, in the
past, we have been treating property rights under the Fifth

Amendment as some sort of poor cousin to the rest of the Bill of
Rights. Therefore, it is time that we recognize the truth, that these
rights are all part of the First Ten Amendments and have to be
treated equally.
This conclusion flies in the face of United States v. Carolene
Products1 0 ° where Justice Stone had written, in a now famous

footnote, that voting rights, discrimination, personal rights against
discrimination, the First Amendment rights, and free speech rights
are to be considered as a higher priority than property rights. 10 1 So
what Justice Rehnquist revealed in citing First Amendment cases
and then declaring that property rights should not be treated as
some kind of poor cousin, is that from here on forward there is
going to be change and heightened scrutiny will be applied to
property right restrictions. No longer will there be an exhaltation of

police powers, particularly where the government demands that
property be dedicated or where the government takes property
rights.
The Court further stated that in considering the cases that have
dealt with the issue of such exactions, there are some cases, (only
one is cited) where the state courts have required a particularized
close connection between the exaction and the need. 102 There are,
99. Examples of the First Amendment cases the majority cites include:
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1973) and Pickering v. Board of Educ. of
Township High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
100. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
101. Famous footnote number four provides in pertinent part that: "It is
unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment then are most other types of
legislation." Id. at 152 n.4.
102. See Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill.
1961) (setting forth the "specific and uniquely attributable" test). The Dolan
Court explained that "[u]nder [the specific and uniquely attributable]
standard.., the local government [must] demonstrate that its exaction is
directly proportional to the specifically created need." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
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of course, lots of cases where the courts have held that what is
required is simply a reasonable relationship. 103 Justice Rehnquist
noted, that what the Court was talking about was fairly close to the
reasonable relationship rule except that the traditional reasonable
relationship rule only provided for a minimum level of scrutiny. In
applying the rough proportionality test the Court is rejecting
reasonable relationship, because the rough proportionality test
104
involves a higher level of scrutiny.
Thus, the City must make an individualized determination that
the dedication is related, both in nature, extent and quantification
to the impact of the proposed development. 105 Note, that it is the
City that must make this determination and prove it in court. Does
that mean that the burden of proof in such a case is upon the
government? The answer to that is clearly yes. 106 That answer
reflects an alteration in land use jurisprudence that is of substantial
dimension. In his dissent, Justice Stevens immediately seized upon
this change but, Justice Rehnquist had no great problem dealing
with it.
The dissenters looked at the two aspects of what the City
demanded. First, it wanted a dedication of property along Fanno
103. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. See, ag., Collis v. Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d
19 (Minn. 1976) (requiring a showing of a reasonable relationship between the
planned subdivision and the municipality's need for land); Call v. West Jordan,
606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979) (affiming use of reasonable relation test).
104. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. Justice Rehnquist simply stated that
[w]e think the 'reasonable relationship' test adopted by a majority of the
state courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm... [b]ut we do not
adopt it as such.... We think a term such as 'rough proportionality' best
encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth

Amendment.
Id
105. Id at 2319-20.
106. Id at 2320 n.8.

Justice Stevens ... is correct in arguing that in evaluating most generally
applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on the party
challenging the regulation... [h]ere, by contrast, the city made an
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building
permit on an individual parcel. In this situation, the burden properly rests
on the city.
Id (citations omitted).
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Creek to keep the flood plain clear and for a greenway. There was
no question that the construction of that parking lot was going to
dump a lot of storm water into the flood plain and into Fanno
Creek, so why wasn't that evidence of proportionality? Why
wasn't that good enough? The answer to the question by Justice
Rehnquist is rather clear. The City did not need a dedication. Why
was the City insisting on this important "strand in the bundle of
property rights," the right to exclude people, when the same results
could have been achieved by imposing a restriction that the
property not be developed or used. That was all that was needed on
the flood problem. If the City wanted to create a greenway, it
should have paid for it. It had no right to take the property. 107 That
was why there was no proportionality with respect to the easement
10 8
adjacent to the flood plain where the bicycle path was to exist.
The City had estimated that the new development on the Dolan
property would produce 435 additional trips a year. 109 The City
estimated that this easement or bicycle/pedestrian pathway could
reduce automobile traffic because some people might use bicycles.
In the Court's majority view that was not good enough.1 10 There
had to be a quantification. How many cars will the
pedestrian/bikeway reduce from the central business district? As
one of the dissenters said, would a percentage estimate suffice? If
the City had spoken in terms of such numbers would that have
107. Id. at 2320.

108. Id. The majority found that increasing the amount of the impervious
surface was legitimate, but more was demanded, the city "not only wanted
petitioner not to build in the flood plain, but it wanted petitioner's property
along Fanno Creek for its Greenway system. The city has never said why a
public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of
flood control." Id.
109. Id. at 2321.
110. Id. at 2321-22.
The city has not met its burden of demonstrating that the additional
number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by the petitioner's
development reasonably relate to the city's requirement for a dedication
of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement. The city simply found that
the creation of the pathway could offset some of the traffic
demand.., and lessen the increase in the traffic congestion.
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sufficed?11 1 Whatever the criticism, we know that there will have
to be a quantification to meet a challenge based on Dolan.
CONCLUSION

Why is Dolan significant in the context of real life zoning? The
planning board that approves a subdivision, or the zoning board of
appeals that grants a variance or a special permit or a site permit
and imposes conditions does not generally have a quantification
survey in its file. Perhaps it has some advice from a planning
director who has stated that there is a need because there will be
more children or more traffic in the area but there is nothing
quantified. Under Dolan, there will now have to be a
quantification.
In addition, and certainly very significantly, shifting the burden
112
of proof to the government is going to have quite an effect.
Shifting the burden of proof in a proceeding which is adjudicative
presents a real problem for municipalities. Is the planning board,
the zoning board of appeals, or for that matter the town board,
which is sitting in judgment on an application, supposed to make a
presentation on the record of the very matter it is deciding? How
would they do that? New York experimented with this idea briefly
3 But then
during the era of Judge Keating in Fullingv. Palumbo.11
dispensed with this requirement.
The Dolan dissenters argued that police power regulations, when
dealing with developments and commercial properties, are really
dealing with business regulations, 114 not the matter of hearth and
111. Id at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the majority's
requirement that the city quantify the traffic benefits of a bike path, noting that
the benefit should be reasonable as long as it was within the range of 5-100%.
Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. ProportionalityandLand Use, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 3, 1994, at F04.
"[L]ocal agencies will be expected to ensure that their land-use conditions are
reasonable before they adopt them - rather than requiring the landowner to bear
the costs of proving in court that they are unreasonable after they [have] been
adopted." Id
113. 21 N.Y.2d 30,233 N.E.2d 272, 286 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1967).
114. Dolan, 114 S.Ct. at 2325 (stating that "subdivision control exactions
are actually business regulations").
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home. Subdividers produce a product; they take land and process
it; produce a product and then they sell it. 115 Justice Stevens, in
1
making this analysis, quotes from a law review article. 16
Responding in a footnote, Justice Rehnquist seems to mock the
source. 117 Justice Stevens went on to raise the specter of the
Lochner era, 118 when the Supreme Court overturned public
welfare legislation as an unconstitutional interference with
contractual rights. In Lochner, the Supreme Court held in 1909 that
it was unconstitutional to fix the maximum working hours for
bakers because it interfered with their freedom to contract. The
case has become a hobgoblin.
The dissenters are of the opinion that the majority in Dolan,
Nollan, Lucas, and other real property and police power cases, are
seeking to elevate property rights to the same level of sanctity as
freedom of speech or other such rights under the Bill of Rights.
Audience Member:
As a practical purpose, won't the quantification requirement
increase the cost of development? If these studies are going to be
done to quantify the exaction then somebody will have to pay for
it. Either a zoning board, town board, or city planning board is
going to have someone test it and do the studies and show what the
development is going to be and whether it is going to pass the cost
on permanently.

115. Id. at 2325 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See John D. Johnston, Jr.,
Constitutionalityof Subdivision ControlExactions: The Quest For a Rationale,
52 CORNELL L.Q. 787, 973 (1967) (asserting that a "subdivider is a

manufacturer, processor and marketer of a product; land is but one of his raw
materials").
116. For the law review article Justice Stevens quoted from, see supra note
115.
117. Dolan, 114 S.Ct. at 2329 n.13.
118. In Lochner, the Supreme Court stated that it was unconstitutional to fix
the maximum working hours for bakers who were working 60 hours a week, for
to do so would interfere with the right of the bakers to freely contract with their
employers. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
That may well be a consequence. It seems to me that when
dealing with a hostile property owner, it is going to be the board's
obligation to quantify the basis for the regulation that the owner is
opposed to. That this will cost more money, there can be little
doubt.
I think the saving grace in all of this, whether it is nexus or
whether it is the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale case is that the builders and the developers are out to
build and develop. They are not interested in three, four, five, or
eight years of litigation and so they go along with the municipal
demands. But if anybody wants to fight, it is going to be difficult
for the government to quantify. If the demands are for the
dedication of property, and actual conveyance, the current majority
of the Supreme Court looks askance at that.
Audience Member:
Except you do not know in advance who is going to fight with
you and who is not and if you are going to protect yourself, you are
going to have these studies done.
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Well, I think I tried to imply that. You will, I suppose, every
time you impose that kind of an exaction, have to have the backup
for it and that is going to cost money. I suspect the back up will
sometimes be spurious anyway, because all you can do is guess as
to what the need really is.
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